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Abstract
When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such
as productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population
into two groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the
other of those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the
second group a first-best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheri-
tance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability
individuals will necessarily face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types
face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100%. With a Rawlsian
social welfare function, the low-ability types too face a more than 100% tax on bequests.
JEL classification: H21.
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1 Introduction
One striking feature of the recent evolution of tax policy around the world has been the
mounting unpopularity of wealth transfer taxation. An increasing number of countries
are without inheritance (or estate) taxes and some, including the US, are contemplat-
ing ways to phase them out. At the same time, countries that continue to tax wealth
transfers raise little revenue from them, despite the fact that the transmitted wealth is
increasing.1 In academic circles, there is little agreement on how these taxes should be
structured. Many believe this issue is part of the broader question of taxation of wealth
and wealth income, and must be analyzed in that context. We agree with Kopczuk
(2009) that the question is best addressed in the most general framework of designing
the economy’s overall tax policy.
The controversies surrounding estate taxes reflect, to a great extent, disagreement
over bequest motives. The literature has highlighted a number of reasons for bequests:
pure altruism, warm glow, strategic (deferred payment for filial attention), and acci-
dental.2 Yet there is little agreement regarding the relative strength of each of theses
elements. Studies suggest that the size of the estate tax is highly sensitive to the rela-
tive importance of different bequest motives.3Not surprisingly, then, one’s view on the
question of motive shapes also one’s view on the appropriate tax treatment of bequests.
While little agreement exists concerning taxation of bequests in general, there is a
widely-held view that accidental bequests should be subjected to a confiscatory tax.
Kaplow (2008, pp 264—66) gives a lucid exposition of the reasons behind this view.
Seen from the perspective of offsprings, Kaplow argues, full insurance in the face of
an uncertain inheritance income is optimal. A 100% bequest tax, with its proceeds
rebated equally to all children, leads to no distortions and mimics this insurance scheme.
1The proceeds do not typically exceed one percent of the aggregate tax revenues; see OECD (2008).
2When annuity markets are imperfect, most people will have a positive wealth at death, even when
they have no bequest motive per se; see Cremer and Pestieau (2005).
3See, e.g., Michel and Pestieau (2002) and Pestieau and Sato (2008).
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Alternatively, seen from the parents’ perspective, the optimal scheme is one of perfect
annuities. Kopczuk (2003) points out that this market too, under certain conditions,
can be mimicked by a government policy which includes 100% bequest taxes. To effect
the first-best solution, one must give the retirees a wealth supplement and then fully
tax the wealth of those who die early. However, the availability of wealth supplements
rests on the individuals’ having strong bequest motives.
Blumkin and Sadka (2003) is, to our knowledge, the only paper that questions the
wisdom of the received view in the context of a second-best tax policy design. They
argue that a non-confiscatory tax on accidental bequests has the desirable consequence of
making the demogrant of an optimal linear income tax system effectively non-uniform.
In this sense, it will act as an additional instrument and increases the efficiency of
the tax system. Our challenge to the 100% tax idea is more basic. In particular, its
rationalization does not rest on having a tax system that disregards useful information.
Quite the opposite! The rationalization comes from Mirrlees’ (1971) teaching that
optimal tax systems must be designed on the basis of all the information that the
tax administration possesses. Discarding useful information leads to a suboptimal tax
structure.
The fundamental point that we make is that bequests, when publicly observable,
have informational content. This content must be incorporated in the design of optimal
tax structures. The point is a general one and applies to all types of bequests regardless
of bequest motives. However, to make our case as stark as possible, we concentrate
exclusively on accidental bequests. Circumventing the identification of bequest motives,
simplifies the analysis drastically and highlights our point most efficiently. Our starting
benchmark requires that, within the context of the tax system as a whole, and when tax
instruments are not artificially restricted, ignoring the informational content of bequests
leads to a 100% tax rate on bequests.4 We show that this result is unwarranted when the
4The tax neither distorts the behavior of parents nor their utility as they have no bequest motive. The
behavior of recipients is not distorted either as accidental bequests are a windfall for them. Moreover, as
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informational content of accidental bequests is taken into account. In many instances,
the optimal bequest tax exceeds 100%, although there are also circumstances that call
for a less than 100% tax.
The paper considers a setting where accidental bequests signal otherwise unobserv-
able individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity. The tax administra-
tion then uses an individual’s inheritance as a separation mechanism, or a “tag,” when
designing an optimal tax system. The population is partitioned into two groups con-
sisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and of those who do. The first group
faces a tax schedule determined on the basis of Mirrlees’ standard optimal non-linear
income tax problem. The second group, on the other hand, faces a non-distortionary
tax scheme. The most interesting results that emerge are that the high-ability types will
be worse off and the low-ability types better off if they receive an inheritance. Moreover,
the high-ability types will face a bequest tax that necessarily exceeds 100% but that
the low-ability types face a tax rate that can be smaller or larger than 100%. With
a Rawlsian social welfare function, the low-ability types too should face a more than
100% tax on bequests.
2 The setting
2.1 Basic model
Consider a two-period overlapping-generation model wherein individuals of each gener-
ation live either for one or two periods. Regardless of their longevity, they work in the
first period only. Those whose parents die early (i.e., live for one period) receive an
inheritance from their parents; those whose parents live for two periods receive nothing.
There are no annuity markets. All individuals, at the beginning of period one, allocate
long as the inheritance tax they pay is determined as part of their total tax liabilities, the recipients will
not become any worse off. This follows because the existence of a non-distortionary source of revenue
reduces the amount of the distortionary tax that the government needs to raise. The optimal allocations
of different households must be independent of who initially owns the non-distortionary revenue sources.
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their resources–earnings plus any inheritances–between present consumption and sav-
ing to be consumed when retired. If individuals stay alive in the second period, they will
consume all their savings and leave no bequests; if they die early, their unused saving is
transmitted to their children as an accidental bequest. Saving is channeled into future
consumption through a storage technology; there is no appreciation or depreciation of
savings so that the interest rate is zero.
Individuals differ in their productivity wi, their survival probability πi, and taste for
future versus present consumption. To model the taste difference, we assign a weight
βi to future consumption in the individuals’ utility functions. We assume that each of
these characteristics take only two values: “high” indexed by h and “low” indexed by
c. We further assume that these characteristics are positively correlated so that there
are only two types of people: h and c with wh > wc, πh > πc, and βh > βc.5 Types
are dynastically immutable: if a person is of type i, his offsprings will also be of type i.
There is no population growth and each generation consists of ni individuals of type i,
where nh + nc = 1.
Individuals have additive quasi-linear preferences over present consumption, ci, fu-
ture consumption, di, and labor supply, Li. An individual’s expected utility is given
by
Ui = πi [ci + βiφ (di)− ϕ (Li)] + (1− πi) [ci − ϕ (Li)]
= ci + πiβiφ (di)− ϕ (Li) , i = h, c, (1)
where φ is strictly concave while ϕ is strictly convex.6
Individuals of the first generation start life with no initial wealth. This will not be
the case for members of the generations that follow, however. Those who die early leave
5 It is sufficient to assume πh = πc and βh = βc with one of the two inequalities being strict.
Preston (1975), and Pritchett and Summers (1996), provide empirical support for the existence of
a positive correlation between ability and longevity; and Bommier (2006) for a positive correlation
between longevity and preferences for future over present consumption.
6This formulation assumes that an individual derives no utility from leaving an accidental bequest
for his family if he dies early.
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an accidental bequest which, unless taxed away, is inherited by their children. Conse-
quently, besides wi, πi and βi, individuals of the second and forthcoming generations
will differ also on the basis of their inherited wealth, ωi. The quasi-linearity of the
utility function (1) ensures that the size of one’s (accidental) bequest to his children is
unaffected by the size of the inheritance that he may have received from his own parents
(including zero). We will then have, in each period, four groups of people: h-types with
either ωh or no inherited wealth and c-types with either ωc or no inherited wealth.7
2.2 Laissez-faire
Recall that there is no annuity market and that private saving, si, is the only source for
financing one’s consumption during retirement years. The optimization problem of an
i-type individual (i = h, c) in the first generation is
max
si,Li
Ui = wiLi − si + πiβiφ (si)− ϕ (Li) , (2)
where we have substituted wiLi−si for ci, and si for di, in the individual’s expected util-
ity given by equation (1). The optimization yields πiβiφ
0 (si) = 1, or si = φ0−1 (1/πiβi),
and wi = ϕ0 (Li) . These relationships, along with the assumptions πh > πc, βh > βc,
strict concavity of φ (·), and strict convexity of ϕ (·), imply that sh > sc and Lh > Lc.
Finally, observe that since in the absence of annuity markets every i-type person saves si
to finance his future consumption, those who die early must leave an accidental bequest
of si behind. That is, ωi = si.
The optimization problem of individuals belonging to second and forthcoming gen-
erations depends on whether they inherit an initial wealth or not. Those who receive no
inheritance have an identical optimization problem to that of the first generation. This
7Dependence of the bequest one leaves on the inheritance one receives leads to multiplicity of groups
on the basis of ωi, making existence of a steady state problematic. Observe also that even with quasi-
linear preferences ωi may take more than two values if the prices (tax rates) that individuals face depend
on their inheritance status. We discuss this issue below when addressing second-best allocations and
their implementation.
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continues to be summarized by (2), resulting in the same solution as those obtained for
the first generation. In particular, a second-generation i-type with no inheritance will
save the same amount as a first-generation i-type. It then also follows that any bequest
left by a second-generation i-type with no inheritance will be identical to that of the
first-generation i-type: ωi = si.
Second-generation individuals who inherit an initial wealth have an optimization
problem summarized by
max
esi,eLi
bUi = wibLi + ωi − bsi + πiβiφ (bsi)− ϕ³bLi´ , (3)
where the symbol ˆ over a variable indicates that it refers to a person who has received
an inheritance, and we have substituted wibLi + ωi − bsi for bci and bsi for bdi. The quasi-
linearity of preferences implies that future consumption and labor supply do not depend
on inherited wealth so that bsi = si and bLi = Li. However, present consumption increases
with wealth and bci > ci. Clearly, with bsi = si, bωi = ωi and equal to the bequest of an
i-type of the first generation. Finally, with sh > sc and Lh > Lc, it thus also follows
that bsh > bsc and bLh > bLc.
The quasi-linearity assumption ensures that, starting with generation two, the econ-
omy is in a stationary-state equilibrium. After that, the equilibrium values of all the
variables remain invariant to time. Specifically, in every period, there will always be nc
unskilled and nh skilled individuals. Of the unskilled workers, nc(1−πc) have an initial
wealth equal to ωc = sc and the remaining ncπc have no wealth; of the skilled workers,
nh(1−πh) have an initial wealth ωh = sh and nhπh have no wealth. And, with sh > sc,
it is also the case that ωh > ωc.
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3 First-best
3.1 Allocation
Assume there is full information. In particular, individual types i = h, c, as well as
the size of their inherited wealth (whether zero or ωi), are publicly observable. The
first-best policy is attained when the government chooses (ci, di, Li) and
³bci, bdi, bLi´ to
maximize social welfare defined by
W =
X
i=h,c
ni
h
πiv(Ui) + (1− πi) v(bUi)i , (4)
where v (·) is a strictly concave transformation of the quasi-linear utility function (1);
hence v0 (·) > 0 and v00 (·) < 0. Aside from this transformation, the social welfare
function defined by (4) is utilitarian in form in that it aggregates the utilities of the
four groups–h- and c-types, each with and without an inheritance–and assigns each a
weight according to their numbers in the society. The role of v (·) is to make the social
welfare function redistributive. Without such a transformation, there will be no aversion
to inequality and thus no redistribution. Observe also that the more concave v (·) is the
more redistributive the social welfare function will be. One common specification for
v (·) is the iso-elastic case v(U) = U1−ε/ (1− ε), suggested by Atkinson (1973). In this
formulation, ε > 0 (ε 6= 1) denotes the inequality aversion index and the higher is ε the
greater will be the desired redistribution.
The resource constraint for the economy is given byX
i=h,c
ni
h
πi (wiLi − ci − πidi) + (1− πi)
³
wibLi − bci − πi bdi´i = 0. (5)
The specification of this constraint implies that the resources available to any genera-
tion are spent in full, with the inheritances that any generation receives offsetting the
bequests it leaves.8 First-best optimum is then characterized by choosing (ci, di, Li)
8While inheritances one generation receives may in principle be different from the bequests it leaves,
such an outcome cannot happen in the steady state.
7
and
³bci, bdi, bLi´ to maximize (4) subject to (5).9 Let μ denote the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with the resource constraint (5). The Lagrangian expression associated with
this problem is
L =
X
i=h,c
ni
(
πi [v(ci + πiβiφ (di)− ϕ (Li)) + μ (wiLi − ci − πidi)] +
(1− πi)
h
v
³bci + πiβiφ³bdi´− ϕ³bLi´´+ μ³wibLi − bci − πi bdi´i
)
. (6)
It follows from the first-order conditions of the above problem that, for i = h, c,
v0 (Ui) = v0
³
Uˆi
´
= μ, (7)
βiφ
0 (di) = βiφ
0
³bdi´ = 1, (8)
ϕ0 (Li) = ϕ0
³bLi´ = μwi. (9)
Denoting the first-best values by superscript FB, it follows from (8)—(9) that
bUi = Ui ≡ UFB, (10)bdh = dh ≡ dFBh > bdc = dc ≡ dFBc , (11)bLh = Lh ≡ LFBh > bLc = Lc ≡ LFBc , (12)
where the first inequality sign follows from βh > βc and the strict concavity of φ (·) , and
the second from wh > wc and the strict convexity of ϕ (·). Observe also that equations
(10)—(12) imply bci = ci ≡ cFBi ,
so that, at the first-best, the difference in type affects one’s allocation but not the
difference in inheritance status. Put differently, allocations of h- and c-types differ but
either one gets the same allocation regardless of receiving an inheritance or not.
9There is also the constraint that si = wiLi − ci ≥ 0, which we assume to be non-binding.
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3.2 Tax policy
We now show that the government is able to decentralize the first-best allocations
through a combination of saving subsidies and lump-sum taxes. Saving subsidies need
only be conditioned on types, but not on inherited wealth, and set at a rate equal to
τ i = 1− πi, (13)
for type i = h, c. Lump sum taxes, which can be negative as well as positive, on the
other hand, must be conditioned on types as well as inherited wealth:
¡bth,btc¢ for those
with an inheritance and (th, tc) for those without. Naturally, these fiscal instruments
must also satisfy the government’s budget constraintX
i=h,c
ni
£
πi (ti − τ isi) + (1− πi)
¡bti − τ ibsi¢¤ = 0.
To see how the optimum is decentralized, observe that the presence of τ i,bti, and ti
changes the budget constraints of the i-type with and without an inheritance to
ci + (1− τ i) si = wiLi + ωi − bti,
ci + (1− τ i) si = wiLi − ti.
The first-order conditions for the i-type’s optimization problem, with or without an
inheritance, yield ϕ0 (Li) = wi and
πiβiφ
0 (si) = 1− τ i = πi.
These are identical to their first-best counterparts resulting in bLi = Li = LFBi andbsi = si = sFBi . Additionally, to ensure bci = ci = cFBi , one must set lump-sum taxes at
the rates ti = wiLFBi − cFBi − πisFBi and bti = wiLFBi + ωi − cFBi − πisFBi .
Finally, observe that the expressions for bti and ti show that
bti = ti + ωi.
9
Now, given identical tax rates on savings, it is natural to consider the difference be-
tween bti and ti as the tax on bequests. Alternatively, one can consider the bequest tax
to be the difference between one’s total tax liabilities when he receives an inheritance
and when he does not. There is no tension between these definitions; however. Given
identical savings under the two scenarios (bsi = si), both definitions lead to the same
answer:10 The implementation of first-best allocations requires a 100% taxation of (acci-
dental) bequests. The i-type with an inheritance ωi, i = h, c, sees his entire inheritance
“confiscated,” after which he is treated like his counterpart with no inheritance.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a society with two types of individuals i = h, c whose prefer-
ences are defined by (1). The types are identified by their productivity wi, their sur-
vival probability πi, and the utility weight they assign to their consumption in retire-
ment βi. The type characteristics are dynastically immutable and satisfy the property
(wh, πh, βh) > (wc, πc, βc).
(i) First-best allocations are characterized by (a) equalization of utilities of all indi-
viduals regardless of their type and inheritance status: bUh = Uh = bUc = Uc, and (b) a
higher accidental bequest for individuals of type h: ωh > ωc.
(ii) Decentralization of first-best allocations requires: (a) Saving subsidies condi-
tioned on types, but not on inherited wealth, set at a rate equal to τ i = 1− πi for type
i, and (b) lump sum taxes conditioned on types as well as inherited wealth:
¡bth,btc¢ for
those with an inheritance and (th, tc) for those without.
10Denote the net taxes an i-type pays, i = h, c, by Ti if he does not receives an inheritance and by eTi
if he does. It must then be the case that
Ti = ti − τ isi,
eTi = eti − τ iesi .
With ti = eti − ωi and si = esi , it also follows that
Ti = eTi − ωi.
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(iii) All accidental bequests are taxed at 100%.
4 Second-best
4.1 Allocation
Define the second-best as a setting wherein individual types, i.e., the characteristics
(wi, πi, βi), and labor supplies, Li, are not publicly observable. The observables are gross
earnings (bIi = wibLi; Ii = wiLi; ), consumption during working years and retirement
(bci, bdi; ci, di), and bequests ωi. This follows the traditional information structure in
optimal non-linear income tax models à la Mirrlees. The only difference is that we have
added bequests as an observable variable and thus potentially taxable.11 The key point
that we make is that observability of bequests is sufficient to identify its recipient’s
type. On the other hand, the type of an individual who receives no inheritance remains
unknown to the government. Given this information structure, the tax administration
uses an individual’s inheritance as a separation mechanism, or a “tag,” when designing
an optimal tax system.12
We start by assuming that the government is able to identify the type of a person
who receives a bequest and then show that this is in fact the case. Given this assump-
tion, the government proceeds to partition the population into two groups: Those who
receive an inheritance and those who do not (tagged as “positive inheritance” and “zero
inheritance”). The zero-inheritance group, consisting of people whose ability remains
private information, will have to face a tax schedule determined on the basis of Mirrlees’
standard optimal non-linear income tax problem. The positive-inheritance group, on
the other hand, need not face a second-best tax schedule. This group consists of peo-
ple whose characteristics can be inferred from the level of the inheritance they receive.
11Throughout the paper we assume that an individual’s tax liability depends only on variables per-
taining to the individual himself: income, consumption, and inheritances received. Socio-political con-
siderations prevent the government to condition a person’s tax liability on his parents’ characteristics.
12Akerlof (1978) is the classic paper on tagging. Boadway and Pestieau (2006), and Cremer et al.
(2010), are among the more recent contributions to this literature.
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Hence a full information solution can be achieved within this group.
To describe the optimal tax policy, we first characterize the optimal allocation con-
strained by the information structure just sketched. As is commonly done in the lit-
erature on tagging, one can formulate the problem within each group independently;
connecting the two via the economy’s resource constraint.13 Put differently, one as-
signs a single resource constraint to the two groups. This continues to be represented
by (5). Let λ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the economy’s resource
constraint, and μ the multiplier associated with the incentive constraint in the group of
individuals who receive no inheritance. The Lagrangian expression associated with this
optimization problem is
L =
X
i=h,c
ni
½
πi
∙
v
µ
ci + πiβiφ (di)− ϕ(
Ii
wi
)
¶
+ μ (Ii − ci − πidi)
¸
+(1− πi)
h
v
³bci + πiβiφ(bdi)− ϕ(bLi)´+ μ³wibLi − bci − πi bdi´io
+ λ
∙
ch + πhβhφ (dh)− ϕ(
Ih
wh
)− cc − πhβhφ (dc) + ϕ(
Ic
wh
)
¸
. (14)
In writing (14), we have followed the common practice of writing the problem in
terms of the (observable) pre-tax income for individuals in the zero-inheritance group
(writing labor supply as Ii/wi). People in the positive-inheritance group face no in-
centive constraint; their earning abilities are observable. Here, to stress the first-best
nature of the problem within this group, we specify the decision variable to be bLi–an
observable as in Section 3.14 Note also that people in the zero-inheritance group pay
a tax equal to Ti = Ii − ci − di (with di being left as an accidental bequest if they die
early). Those in the positive-inheritance group, on the other hand, pay a tax equal tobTi = bIi+ωi−bci− bdi. In the steady state ωi = bdi, and the expression for the tax payment
of people with a positive inheritance simplifies to bTi = bIi − bci.
Observe that bequests do not appear directly in the economy’s resource constraint.
13See, e.g., Cremer et al. (2010).
14Although one can equally express the problem in terms of eIi.
12
This follows because bequests are simply a transfer between generations, with the inher-
itances one generation receives offsetting the bequests it leaves. However, bequests ap-
pear indirectly in (14), being the defining characteristic of zero- and positive-inheritance
groups. It is because of the information that bequests convey that (14) does not contain
an incentive constraint for people in the positive-inheritance group.
The first-order conditions for i = h, c are, for people with an inheritance:
∂L
∂bci = ni (1− πi)
h
v0
³bUi´− μi = 0, (15)
∂L
∂ bdi = ni (1− πi)
h
v0
³bUi´πiβiφ0 ³bdi´− μπii = 0, (16)
∂L
∂bLi = ni (1− πi)
h
−v0
³bUi´ϕ0 ³bLi´+ μwii = 0, (17)
and for those without an inheritance:
∂L
∂ch
= nhπh
£
v0 (Uh)− μ
¤
+ λ = 0, (18)
∂L
∂dh
= nhπh
£
v0 (Uh)πhβhφ
0 (dh)− μπh
¤
+ λπhβhφ
0 (dh) = 0, (19)
∂L
∂Ih
= nhπh
∙
−v0 (Uh)
1
wh
ϕ0
µ
Ih
wh
¶
+ μ
¸
− λ
wh
ϕ0
µ
Ih
wh
¶
= 0, (20)
∂L
∂cc
= ncπc
£
v0 (Uc)− μ
¤
− λ = 0, (21)
∂L
∂dc
= ncπc
£
v0 (Uh)πcβcφ
0 (dc)− μπc
¤
− λπhβhφ0 (dc) = 0, (22)
∂L
∂Ic
= ncπc
∙
−v0 (Uh)
1
wc
ϕ0
µ
Ic
wc
¶
+ μ
¸
+
λ
wh
ϕ0
µ
Ic
wh
¶
= 0. (23)
Consider first the group who receive an inheritance. Simplifying and rearranging equa-
tions (15)—(17) yields, for i = h, c,
v0
³bUi´ = μ, (24)
βiφ
0
³bdi´ = 1, (25)
ϕ0
³bLi´ = wi. (26)
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This is the same characterization as in the first best indicating no distortion on either
labor supply or future consumption. This is not surprising. We have a first-best solution
for the people in positive-inheritance group because their characteristics are observable.
Equations (24)—(26) also imply, as with the first-best solution, bUh = bUc, bdh > bdc, andbLh > bLc. That is, in the positive-inheritance group, the utility levels for high- and low-
ability types are equalized, but that a high-ability type consumes more in the second
period, and works more in the first, as compared with a low-ability type.
Turning to the group whose members do not receive an inheritance, equations (18)—
(23) yield
v0 (Uh) = μ−
λ
nhπh
, (27)
βhφ
0 (dh) = 1, (28)
1
wh
ϕ0
µ
Ih
wh
¶
= 1, (29)
v0 (Uc) = μ+
λ
ncπc
, (30)
βcφ
0 (dc) = 1 +
λφ0 (dc)
μncπc
∙
βh
πh
πc
− βc
¸
, (31)
1
wc
ϕ0
µ
Ic
wc
¶
= 1 +
λ
μncπc
∙
1
wh
ϕ0
µ
Ic
wh
¶
− 1
wc
ϕ0
µ
Ic
wc
¶¸
. (32)
Equations (27)—(32) show that taxation of individuals with no initial wealth subscribes
to the customary properties of second-best income taxation. Specifically, equations
(28)—(29) yield the “no distortion at the top” result (applying to both dh and Lh).
Moreover, with (wh, πh, βh) > (wc, πc, βc), the bracketed expressions in the right-hand
sides of (31) and (32) are both positive. Consequently, the left-hand sides of (31) and
(32) exceed one: βcφ
0 (dc) > 1 and wc > ϕ0 (Lc) . In words, consumption of dc and supply
of Lc are distorted downward. Finally, comparing βhφ
0 (dh) = 1 with βcφ
0 (dc) > 1 and
wh = ϕ0 (Lh) with wc > ϕ0 (Lc) in conjunction with strict concavity of φ (·) and strict
convexity of ϕ (·) , tells us that dh > dc and Lh > Lc.
The interesting question from our perspective is to find out in what way the second-
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best allocation of an i-type differs on the basis of his tag (belonging to the positive-
or zero-inheritance group). To address this issue, compare the first-order conditions
(24)—(26) pertaining to the positive-inheritance group with (27)—(32) pertaining to the
zero-inheritance group. Consider first, the h-type who faces no distortion regardless of
his inheritance status. Comparing (25)—(26) with (28)—(29) informs us that
bdh = dh, (33)bLh = Lh. (34)
Observe that these equalities arise not only because of the no-distortion at the top
property but also the quasi-linearity of preferences. This latter property directs any
potential differences in allocations due to income effects towards individuals’ first-period
consumption levels. Comparison of (24) with (27) reveals the impact of income effects.
We have bUh < Uh. (35)
Rather counter-intuitively, the high-ability type who is the beneficiary of an accidental
bequest ends up with less utility than his counterpart who receives no inheritance.
Now, with second-period consumption and leisure being the same for an h-type with
and without an inheritance, it also follows that
bch < ch. (36)
The lower level of utility enjoyed by the h-type who receives an inheritance, manifests
itself in a lower amount of first-period consumption.
Next consider the c-types with and without an inheritance. The difference in their
allocations arise from both income and incentive effects. Comparison of (25)—(26) with
(31)—(32) reveals that
bdc > dc, (37)bLc > Lc. (38)
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An c-type who receives an inheritance consumes more in the second period and works
more in the first as compared to an c-type who receives no inheritance. This is due to
his facing no distortions when he receives an inheritance but facing them when he has
no inheritance. Turning to utility levels, comparing (24) with (30) informs us that
bUc > Uc. (39)
The c-type enjoys a higher level of utility if he receives an inheritance. However, these
inequalities do not allow us to compare bcc and cc.
To complete the discussion, we now ascertain the correctness of our initial assump-
tion that observability of bequests identifies recipients’ types. One can do this despite
the fact that accidental bequests take three distinct values but we have only two types
of recipients. The identification follows from our finding that bdh = dh > bdc > dc. Given
these properties, leaving behind bdh = dh indicates that the deceased must have been of
type h while leaving either bdc or dc indicates type c. The assumption of a dynastically
immutable family type then establishes the recipient’s type.
4.2 Tax policy
The tax policy is set to implement the second-best allocations characterized by (15)—
(17) for the h- and c-types in the positive-inheritance group and (18)—(23) for the h-
and c-types in the zero-inheritance group. To achieve this, the tax policy specifies an
implementing tax schedule T (I, s, ω) as a function of the observable variables.15 Thus
the tax paid by an i-type will be bTi = T (bIi, bsi, ωi) if he receives an inheritance and
Ti = T (Ii, si, 0) if he does not.
In what follows, we concentrate on the properties of T (I, s, ω) that pertain to the
taxation of bequests. The properties of T (I, s, ω) with respect to income follow those of
the Mirrlees optimal income tax problem. The properties of T (I, s, ω) with respect to
15One could also include c which can always be inferred from observability of the other variables.
However, this argument would be redundant.
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saving is derived in the Appendix. Suffice it to say here that implementation requires, as
in the first best, saving subsidies. Now recall that in the first best, savings are subsidized
at a rate equal to 1− πh for the h-type and 1− πc for the c-type whether or not they
receive an inheritance. In the second best, only the h-type faces the same subsidy rate
regardless of his inheritance status. Moreover, the subsidy rate is the same as in the first
best. The treatment of the c-type, on the other hand, depends on whether he receives
an inheritance or not. If he does, he will face a marginal subsidy rate of 1−πc as in the
first best. If he does not, he will face a smaller marginal subsidy rate.16
In discussing the tax treatment of bequests, begin with the high-ability individuals.
We have, from equations (33)—(36), bsh = sh, bLh = Lh, and bch < ch. These imply
bTh > Th + ωh.
Consequently, the difference between the taxes an h-type pays if he receives an in-
heritance and if he does not, exceeds the inheritance he receives. In this sense, the
high-ability individuals face a tax on accidental bequests that is higher than 100%.
This should not be surprising if one remembers that receiving ωh identifies the person
as a high-ability individual. With their ability known, the high-ability types in the
positive-inheritance group enjoy no “informational rent,” the extra utility that accrues
to them under asymmetric information. The symmetry of the social welfare function
then implies that the h-types in this group end up with the same utility level as the
c-types. On the other hand, the ability of the h-types in the zero-inheritance group
remains private information and they enjoy some informational rent.
Comparing how the c-types in positive- and zero-inheritance groups fare is rather
more complicated. What is clear from the results characterized by (37)—(39) is that bTc
16Our formulation of second-best assumes public observability of savings at the individual level and
thus admits nonlinear taxation. An alternative formulation is to assume that only anonymous savings
are observable so that savings must be taxed linearly. This latter formulation can be done along Cremer
and Gahvari (1997). The nature of information on savings, and the ensuing properties of marginal
savings subsidies, does not change our results with respect to the taxation of bequests which is the focus
of our paper. We have thus ignored this issue.
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and Tc + ωc are generally different. This implies that the c-types too should not face
a 100% tax on their inheritance. However, at this level of generality, it is not possible
to determine whether the tax is smaller or larger than 100%. Specifically, the fact thatbUc > Uc is not sufficient to conclude that the c-type in the positive-inheritance group
pays a smaller tax than the c-type in the zero-inheritance group. This follows because
the c-type in the zero-inheritance group faces a distortion and his lower level of utility
may very well be due to this distortion. We will show below, through a numerical
example, that the tax rate can be larger as well as smaller than 100%.
4.3 An example
Consider a quadratic disutility for labor ϕ(L) = L2/2 and a logarithmic utility for
future consumption φ(d) = ln d so that our quasi-linear preferences (1) takes the form
Ui = ci + πiβi ln di − L2i /2. Assume further that the concave transformation for U is
iso-elastic, as previously defined, and given by v(U) = U1−ε/ (1− ε) with ε > 0. The
various parameter of the model are set as follows: wh = 2, wc = 1, nh = nc = 1, πh =
πc = 1/2, βh = 1, βc = 1/2. Table 1 reports the numerical solutions the second-best
allocations for ε = 1/2 and ε = 11. It also reports the values of marginal savings
subsidies and net taxes collected in each case.17
The interesting property from our perspective is the behavior of bTc − Tc in relation
to ωc as ε increases. With ε = 1/2, we have bTc = −0.458, Tc = −0.872, and ωc = 0.50.
Consequently, bTc < Tc + ωc = −0.372 and the tax c-types pay on accidental bequests
is less than 100%. On the other hand, ε = 11 results in bTc = −0.456, Tc = −0.974,
and ωc = 0.50. In this case, bTc > Tc + ωc = −0.474 and the tax c-types pay on
17These are given by
Ti = Ii − ci − di ,
eTi = eIi + ωi − eci − edi = eIi − eci.
18
Table 1. Second-best allocations and bequest taxes
ε = 0.50 ε = 11
positive inheritance zero inheritance positive inheritance zero inheritancebch, ch 2.785 2.872 2.783 2.801bdh, dh 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000bIh, Ih 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000bcc, cc 1.458 1.361 1.456 1.370bdc, dc 0.500 0.474 0.500 0.456bIc, Ic 1.000 0.963 1.000 0.852bTh, Th 1.215 0.128 1.217 0.199bTc, Tc -0.458 -0.872 -0.456 -0.974
accidental bequests is more than 100%.18 This finding is interesting in two ways. First,
it shows that the second-best tax on accidental bequests may fall short of as well as
exceed a confiscatory rate. Second, it is indicative of the impact of the desired degree of
redistribution on the size of the tax. Whereas a “small” degree of inequality aversion–
a small ε–calls for a bequest tax of less than 100%, a “large” degree of inequality
aversion–a large ε–results in a bequest tax that exceeds 100%.
4.4 Rawlsian social welfare
The above example alerts us to the possibility that a higher degree of desired redis-
tribution leads to higher tax rate on accidental bequests (by the c-types). One can
18The definition of the bequest tax becomes rather ambiguous here. One can think of the bequest
tax to be T (I, s, ω) − T (I, s, 0), i.e., the extra tax paid by an individual with bequest ω, for a given
value for every other argument of the tax function. But for a nonlinear tax function, this differ-
ence is not (necessarily) constant and generally varies with the values I and s take. There is also an
added problem in our two-type setting. Here, one has to calculate T (Ii, si, ωi)− T (Ii, si, 0) as well as
T

eIi, esi, ωi

− T

eIi, esi, 0

which may not only yield different answers but more problematically are
not even unambiguously defined by the optimal allocation. The problem is that T (Ii, si, ωi) in the first
expression and T

eIi, esi, 0

in the second are hypothetical. As usual, in two-type models, there are many
degrees of freedom in constructing the implementing tax function and this affects T (I, s, ω)−T (I, s, 0).
We circumvent all these difficulties by defining the bequest tax to be the difference between net tax
payments for an i-type if he receives an inheritance and if he does not: T

eIi, esi, ωi

− T (Ii, si, 0) .
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indeed derive a formal result that support this view if the social welfare function is
Rawlsian. In our setup, the Rawlsian solution is obtained as the limit for a suitably-
defined transformation function v (·). Specifically, it is obtained by letting ε → ∞ in
v(U) = U1−ε/ (1− ε) .
With a Rawlsian social welfare function, the utility level of the low-ability individuals
should be equalized across the two tagged groups of positive- and zero-inheritance:bUc = Uc. Recall that the c-type faces a distortion in the zero-inheritance group but not
in the positive-inheritance group. Attaining the same utility level despite the distortion
in the zero-inheritance group, requires the c-type to have more resources at his disposal.
Consequently, Tc < bTc − ωc or bTc > Tc + ωc. In words, the c-type in the positive-
inheritance group faces a bequest tax that exceeds 100%.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the society described in Proposition 1 but assume that indi-
vidual types are not publicly observable while income, consumption levels, and bequests
are.
(i) The second best solution has the following properties: (a) Individuals can be
partitioned into two groups (tags): Those who receive an accidental bequest and those
who do not. The characteristics of people in the first group can be inferred from their
bequests and they will be given a first-best tax schedule. The characteristics of people
in the second group remain private information and they will face a standard Mirrlees
optimal tax problem. (b) The high-ability individuals who receive an inheritance lose all
their informational rent and bUh = bUc. (c) Individuals in the zero-inheritance group face
no distortion at the top and a downward distortion on labor supply and savings for the
c-types. The h-types in this group enjoy some informational rent so that Uh > Uc.
(ii) Second-best allocation of the h-types in the positive- and zero-inheritance groups
differ according to bch < ch, bdh = dh, bLh = Lh, and we have bUh < Uh.
(iii) Second-best allocation of the c-types in the positive- and zero-inheritance groups
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differ according to bdc > dc, bLc > Lc, and we have bUc > Uc.
(iv) Decentralization of second-best allocations requires: (a) Marginal saving subsi-
dies; (b) High-ability individuals face a bequest tax of more then 100%: bTh > Th + ωh;
(c) Low-ability individuals face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than
100%; i.e., one can have bTc < Tc + ωc or bTc > Tc + ωc.
(v) With a Rawlsian social welfare function, everyone who receives an inheritance
pays an inheritance tax of more than 100%.
5 Summary and conclusion
This paper has questioned the validity of the conventional wisdom that purely acciden-
tal bequests should be taxed at a confiscatory rate. It has employed a model wherein
individuals of different abilities may live for one or for two periods with different prob-
abilities of survival. It has shown that the proposition is correct in a first-best environ-
ment when individuals’ productivity and longevity are publicly observable. Under this
circumstance, subsidizing each ability-type’s saving at a rate equal to his probability of
an early death, in conjunction with lump-sum taxes that vary according to individuals’
ability types and inheritance status, mimics a perfect annuity market. All accidental
bequests are taxed at 100% and all individuals enjoy the same level of utility.
In the second-best, individual abilities and survival probabilities are publicly un-
observable. Assuming that types and survival probabilities are positively correlated,
individuals can be partitioned into two groups (tags). The first group consists of people
who receive an accidental bequest and the second of those who receive nothing. The
characteristics of people in the first group can be inferred from their bequests and they
will be given a first-best tax schedule. The characteristics of people in the second group
remains private information and they will have to face a standard Mirrlees optimal tax
problem.
With their ability type being inferred, the high-ability individuals in the group of
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people who receive an inheritance enjoy no informational rent and will end up with the
same utility level as the low-ability types in this group. On the other hand, high-ability
types in the group of people who receive no inheritance enjoy an informational rent. This
implies that high-ability types will be better off if they do not receive an inheritance.
Similar comparison for low-ability types reveals that they will be better off receiving
an inheritance. In this sense, accidental bequests are a curse for the rich and a boon
for the poor. Finally, to decentralize these allocations, one must levy marginal saving
subsidies that vary with income and inheritance status. High-ability individuals face a
bequest tax of more then 100%, while low-ability individuals face a bequest tax that
can be smaller as well as larger than 100%. With a Rawlsian social welfare function,
everyone who receives an inheritance pays an inheritance tax of more than 100%.
We conclude by observing that this paper has admittedly focused on a highly styl-
ized setting wherein the observability of bequests brings about a drastic change in the
structure of information available to the tax authority. In following this approach, we
have been led by a desire to convey our point in a crisp fashion with no ambiguity. How-
ever, our main point that incorporating the informational content of bequests improves
the design of tax structures and the properties of bequest taxes would go through under
less drastic assumptions. The design of the optimal tax policy would of course become
more complicated.
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Appendix A
Characterization of marginal saving subsidies: Faced with the tax function
T (I, s, ω), the i-type in the positive-inheritance group chooses I and s to maximize
bUi = I + ωi − T (I, s, ωi)− d+ πiβiφ (s)− ϕµ Iwi
¶
,
and the i-type in the zero-inheritance group chooses I and s to maximize
Ui = I − T (I, s, 0)− d+ πiβiφ (s)− ϕ
µ
I
wi
¶
,
where in both cases we have set d = s. Denote the partial derivative of T (·) with respect
to s by Ts(·). The first-order condition with respect to s, whether one is in the positive
or zero-inheritance group, is then equal to
−Ts(I, s, ω)− 1 + πiβiφ0 (s) = 0.
Comparing this condition with its counterparts in the second-best [first-order condition
(19) for everyone who receives an inheritance, and (28) and (31) for h- and c-types who
do not receive an inheritance] yields the following marginal saving subsidies:
− Ts
³bIi, bsi, ωi´ = 1− πiβiφ0 (bsi) = 1− πi, i = h, c, (A1)
− Ts (Ih, sh, 0) = 1− πhβhφ0 (sh) = 1− πh, (A2)
− Ts (Ic, sc, 0) = 1− πcβcφ0 (sc) = 1− πc
∙
λφ0 (sc)
μncπc
µ
βh
πh
πc
− βc
¶¸
. (A3)
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